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In 1963, when a wide-ranging economic reform program was initiated by President Park 
Chung-hee, South Korea’s per capita income level was lower than those of Bolivia and 
Mozambique; according to the Penn World Tables, by the time of the 1997 financial 
crisis, it exceeded those of Greece and Portugal. During this period, economic 
performance was nothing short of spectacular: the country experienced only a single year 
of negative growth—1980 in the wake of the second oil shock and the Park assassination 
(figure 1), real per capita income growth measured in purchasing power–adjusted terms 
averaged more than 6 percent annually, and per capita income stood at more than eight 
times its level when reforms began.  
During this period, the state intervened pervasively in all facets of economic life, 
from labor and capital markets, to product markets, to international trade and finance, 
meaning that rapid sustained growth occurred for several decades under a state-led 
development strategy in which the state was most definitely a “player” in the popular 
parlance. 
Problems arose as the country approached the international technological frontier, 
and opportunities for easy technological catch-up began to erode. The disappearance of 
straightforward paths for industrial upgrading based on imitating the prior trajectories of 
more advanced economies put a heightened premium on the ability of government 
officials, corporate managements, and their financiers to discern emerging profit 
opportunities. The old development strategy was no longer adequate, but decades of 
state-led growth fostered a formidable constellation of incumbent stakeholders opposed 
to liberalization and transition toward a more market-oriented development model, and in 
1997, in the context of the broader Asian upheaval, South Korea experienced a financial 
crisis with net clean-up costs that eventually amounted to 16 percent of 2001 GDP. 
One might have anticipated that a shock of this magnitude would have contributed 
to thoroughly discrediting the old model, but old habits die hard: There is a two-way 
relationship between individual attitudes or preferences and local policies and institutions 
(Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln 2005). Local practices influence individual’s perceptions 
of the world, and individual’s beliefs condition the politically acceptable bounds of 
policy. Because of the self-reinforcing nature of this feedback loop, change tends to come 
only slowly. Once established, it can take generations for local beliefs to converge toward 
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broader international norms. Perhaps conditioned by a history of pervasive intervention in 
the economy, South Koreans appear to have high expectations about what the public 
sector can deliver, but in a 2004 survey, business executives identified “policy 
instability” and “inefficient bureaucracy” as the two most problematic factors in doing 
business in South Korea (figure 2). With growth slowing and the polity seemingly 
afflicted by a kind of malaise, South Korea could be facing a situation in which the 
reputation-derived “Korean discount” acts as a semi-permanent self-reinforcing drag on 
economic performance.  
This is the awkward legacy that the state-led model has bequeathed South Korea: 
Like an aging football star, the state can no longer be the player it once was—the game 
has simply become too fast and complex—but it seems unwilling or unable to trade in its 
player’s cleats for a referee’s whistle.  
FROM PLAYER… 
South Korea inherited an economic legacy of state from Japanese colonial occupation 
(1910–45) that carried into the period of independence (1948), reflecting the dirigiste 
character of Japanese administration and the continuation of extensive controls by the US 
military authorities in the immediate post-war period. A continuing theme throughout 
South Korean economic history has been the critical role of the state, its role in the 
generation of rents, and the politicization of their distribution, starting with the first 
president of South Korea, Rhee Syng-man, who exploited the policy-generated rents to 
build political power.1 According to Cho (1994), South Korean economic policy was 
aimed at maximizing the value of American aid in the aftermath of the Korean War 
(1950–53), which had devastated the country. Aid, which facilitated politicized rent 
distribution, financed most of the capital accumulation and, at its peak in the late 1950s, 
more than half the imports (figure 3). 
A military government led by General Park Chung-hee took control in 1961. As 
shown in figure 4, when Park seized power, gross domestic saving net of aid was 
                                                 
1 See Cargill (1999) for a comparison of the Japanese and South Korean financial systems. See Jones and 
SaKong (1980) and Woo (1991) for examples of the use of state-derived rents for political power building. 
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derisory. Gross investment, financed mostly by aid, stood at a bit more than 10 percent of 
GDP, and the current account was in rough balance. After two years of poor economic 
performance, the military government unified the existing multiple exchange rate system, 
devalued the currency, raised the real interest rate, and initiated a series of wide-ranging 
reforms. Domestic saving net of aid began rising rapidly (looking at figure 4 one can 
understand why development economists adopted Rostow’s take-off metaphor). 
Domestic investment began rising even faster.  
While in some ways Park’s reform package marked a fundamental departure from 
past practices (with respect to trade policy, for example), it retained an important role for 
the state in the development process. Bank of Korea’s independence was ended, and 
itwas made subservient to the Ministry of Finance and, ultimately, the Blue House. 
Incentives were firm-specific, tied to performance, and personalized. Export targets were 
specified in considerable detail by product, market, and exporting firm. Export 
performance was seized as a barometer of success—as one observer put it, “they were the 
only statistics that could not be faked.” Aside data concerns, exports were interpreted as a 
relatively clean measure of the relative competitiveness of domestic producers—local 
firms might be able to rig the small, protected domestic market, but this was not possible 
in the global marketplace. 
Firms that did not achieve their targets were not subject to penalty; however, the 
targets were sometimes negotiated jointly with wastage allowances (a form of subsidy), 
and support was terminated to laggards. The president received monthly briefings on 
export performance, and the firm achieving the highest export performance could receive 
the national medal of honor, a public presidential commendation, and material benefits 
including relaxed tax surveillance (Westphal and Kim 1982). 
The distinguishing feature of South Korean product markets has been the 
prominence of the chaebol (family-dominated conglomerates). In positive terms, such 
organizations might be considered an institutional response to conditions of scarce 
managerial or human capital and limited financial markets. This organizational form 
could also have been derived from rent-seeking behavior generated through state 
intervention in the economy, and a number of the chaebol had originated from business-
government relations during the Rhee regime of the 1950s (Jones and SaKong 1980). 
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Pervasive regulatory entry barriers (and thus protection from competition for 
incumbents), and Park’s penchant for sole-sourcing important infrastructural and other 
large-scale government-supported projects, in effect socialized risk and created 
opportunities for cross-subsidization across different business ventures, encouraging the 
chaebol to diversify into otherwise unrelated lines of business. By the 1980s, the top 10 
chaebol accounted for more than 20 percent of national income (SaKong 1993, table 
A.20). Where industrial policies proved insufficient to call forth the desired supply 
response, the government established parastatal enterprises such as the Pohang Iron and 
Steel Corporation (POSCO). 
The accumulation of capital contributed to rapid technological upgrading and a 
stunning transformation of the composition of output. In 1963, nonfuel primary products 
accounted for more than half of South Korea’s exports, and human hair wigs were the 
third leading item. A decade later, South Korea’s exports were dominated by 
manufactures such as textiles, electrical products, and iron and steel; only one primary 
product category, fish, made the top ten. As seen in figure 4, capital accumulation was 
financed primarily by growing domestic savings, augmented by a significant inflow of 
savings from abroad, reaching nearly 10 percent of GDP in 1971 and actually breaching 
this threshold in 1974 after the first oil shock. 
A substantial academic literature (e.g., Westphal, Rhee, and Purcell 1981; 
Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1985) attempts to understand the sources of South Korean 
industrial competence and documents the varied forms of technological transfer and 
interaction between South Korean and foreign firms. Inward foreign direct investments 
were negligible during this period. Capital inflows arrived predominately in the form of 
technologically disembodied loans. 
In 1972, Park, who had been reelected for a third term, pushed through the Yushin 
(Revitalization) Constitution, which in essence made him president-for-life. For a variety 
of reasons, he initiated the intensive promotion of heavy industry through what came to 
be known as the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) policy. Modest financial-sector 
liberalizations that had been undertaken in the late 1960s were reversed in 1972, when 
interest rates were lowered and direct government control of the banking system was 
increased in order to channel capital to preferred sectors, projects, or firms (figure 5). In 
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order to finance large-scale projects, special public financial institutions were established, 
and private commercial banks were instructed to make loans to strategic projects on a 
preferential basis. By the late 1970s, the share of these “policy loans” had risen to 60 
percent (Yoo 1994). These loans carried, on average, negative real interest rates, and the 
annual interest subsidy grew from about 3 percent of GNP in 1962–71 to approximately 
10 percent of GNP on average between 1972 and 1979 (Pyo 1989).2 With such a large 
share of national income at stake, the allocation of these highly subsidized loans became 
the focus of intense political activity. This policy of capital channeling rested on the twin 
pillars of financial repression and comprehensive capital controls to delink the domestic 
and international financial markets (Noland 2005). The won was kept nonconvertible. 
In practice, this stance meant emphasizing indirect finance and maintaining 
limitations on foreign participation in financial markets and domestic firm access to 
foreign capital. Presumptively less compliant foreign banks could not be allowed into the 
market in any significant way, for if they were allowed to establish a significant presence, 
they would undermine domestic banks operating under the burden of “policy lending.”3 
Thus the financial system had to be built around a relatively small number of South 
Korean banks, and corporate finance had to be largely limited through regulatory fiat and 
tax provisions to borrowing from those intermediaries.  
Alternative sources of corporate finance were suppressed: The development of 
money markets and bond markets was retarded and restricted to a limited range of 
maturities with no real secondary markets, and issuance was effectively dependent on 
bank guarantees. The government discouraged the development of an efficient auction and 
secondary market for government bonds, and no swap, bond, or interest futures markets 
existed. As for the stock market, in 1990 the government established a quarterly quota on 
new issues, and prior to the 1997 crisis, a backlog of more than 360 companies was 
                                                 
2 The definition of “policy loans” is imprecise, and various sources report significantly different figures. See 
Cho (1994) for discussion and SaKong (1993, tables A.18 and A.19) and Krueger and Yoo (2002) for 
alternative calculations.  
3 In the characterization of one South Korean economist, “Dominance of the Korean financial market by 
foreign institutions were abhorred, as it would deprive authority over various instruments of monetary 
control, weaken many customary, informal practices associated with industrial policy, and might also alter 
the public-good nature of the financial system” (Lee 1993, 7). 
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waiting to be listed (relative to the 776 that were already on the exchange). Criminal 
proceedings documented how firms were forced to resort to bribing officials to bring 
their initial public offerings to the market. As a result of these policies, corporate capital 
sourced through bank loans exceeded equity, bonds, and commercial paper combined 
until the late 1980s, and indirect finance from all sources was the primary form of 
corporate finance until 1991 (Cho 2002, table 4).  
During its period of rapid industrialization, South Korea experienced a rapid shift 
out of rural employment into manufacturing and services. Accompanying this shift was a 
rise in recorded female labor-force participation. Hours worked were quite long, and few 
envied South Korea’s safety record. Yet South Korea appeared to achieve “growth with 
equity:” Measured wage inequality was low by international standards, as might be 
expected in the case of an industrializing labor-abundant country rapidly increasing its 
exposure to international trade (and inter alia the demand for low-skill labor in the export 
sector), though there is some reason to question the South Korean government statistics 
on this point (cf. Lindauer 1997). In certain respects, South Korean labor markets 
developed a dualistic structure in which the industrial employees of the major chaebol 
occupied a privileged position relative to similarly skilled workers (i.e., they were able to 
capture some of the rents accruing to the chaebol) (Park 1999). 
During the Rhee government, South Korea copied its early (and largely 
inappropriate and ignored) labor laws from those of developed countries. In 1963, the 
military government revised the labor laws to discourage the establishment of 
independent labor unions and encouraged the organization of unions within a centralized 
system, established so as to facilitate government control. Subsequent legislation 
circumscribed union activities, and independent trade unions were effectively banned in 
1971. The Korean labor movement subsequently developed a dualistic structure, with 
government-approved unions on the one hand and informal or underground unions on the 
other. Industrial unions were reorganized along Japanese lines as company unions to 
discourage strikes, and “third parties” were prohibited from intervening in labor disputes 
(some of the unofficial unions had grown out of religious organizations, and student 
radical groups were sometimes interested in inserting themselves into enterprise 
disputes). Although the labor laws were revised on several occasions during the 1980s, 
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the reforms did not adequately address this situation. After an uptick in the late 1980s, 
membership has continued to decline to the point that a smaller share of the South 
Korean labor force is unionized than is the case in the United States. Despite the relative 
absence of unions, labor markets remain fairly inflexible and dualistic. In the World 
Bank’s report Doing Business in 2006, South Korea ranked 105 out of 155 countries 
evaluated in the ability to hire and fire employees (World Bank 2005). 
Park was assassinated in 1979 during what amounted to a palace coup. General 
Chun Doo-hwan and his fellow officers more or less stumbled into power, driven more 
by intra-military rivalries and narrow career interests than by any real sense of where they 
wanted to take the country (Clifford 1997). Facing deteriorating economic performance, 
exacerbated by the second oil shock, Chun and his cronies turned to Western-trained 
economic technocrats, who were already attempting to introduce a stabilization policy 
and reverse the worst excesses of the HCI policy.4 These technocrats implemented a 
policy of macroeconomic stabilization through which they began to liberalize and 
deregulate the South Korean economy. Despite the fact that the external shocks that hit 
South Korea during 1979–81 were actually larger than those experienced by a number of 
crisis economies including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, South Korea managed 
to avoid financial trouble until the early 1980s slowdown in global growth in the wake of 
the second oil shock and was able to re-attain high sustained growth by 1983 (Balassa 
1985, table 1). 
Multiple implications arise from these policies. First, the firms emphasized 
growth, not profitability, since risk was socialized, and increased borrowing made further 
borrowing advantageous under the “too big to fail” notion, promoted by the 
government’s habitual interventions. From the standpoint of a lender, the bigger the firm, 
the more creditworthy it was, since size increased the likelihood that the government 
would intervene in the event that the firm got into financial trouble, which it did on a 
fairly routine basis. The implication was that firms became extraordinarily leveraged as 
                                                 
4 Chun literally scheduled early morning tutoring sessions. Perhaps there is something peculiarly Korean 
about this: It is hard to imagine the typical military dictator staying up late to study for his daily economics 
lesson. 
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growth became the name of the game.5 Loans were the mechanism for growth and, 
paradoxically, debt signaled creditworthiness, a state of affairs that Yoo (1999) described 
as the “survival of the fattest.” Indeed, one study of corporate finance covering the 
decade 1977–86 found that “the largest firms have the weakest financial structure,” as 
measured by the degree of equity in their capital structures (Kim 1990, 342), while 
another found that the major chaebol were systematically less profitable than other South 
Korean firms (Krueger and Yoo 2002). A corollary to this system of corporate financing 
was the encouragement of extensive cross-shareholding, cross-loan guarantees, and 
nontransparency, all of which served to facilitate borrowing and had the effect of 
disadvantaging outside shareholders. 
The pervasive pattern of government intervention created a symbiotic relationship 
between the government and the private sector, eroding private-sector autonomy and 
facilitating the corruption of the political system. The move toward more genuine political 
competition in the late 1980s arguably shifted the balance of power away from the 
government and toward the private sector, which became the source of badly needed 
campaign funds (Kang 2002a, 2002b). In the words of one contemporary observer, 
corruption “exploded” (Clifford 1997). With the exception of current President Roh Moo-
hyun, every South Korean president since Park Chung-hee and/or at least one of their 
sons has been imprisoned on corruption offenses.  
 
ASSESSMENT  
 
Did this policy package contribute to accelerating South Korean growth over what might 
have been obtained through a less interventionist strategy? For selective intervention 
policies to be successful, the market equilibrium must be suboptimal. Governments must 
be able to identify these opportunities for welfare-enhancing interventions, formulate and 
implement the appropriate policies, and prevent political market failures from leading the 
                                                 
5 In July 1997, just prior to the crisis, the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty largest chaebol exceeded 
400 percent (Yoo 1999, table 9). By the end of 1997, it stood at 500 percent, and 600 percent of the debt of 
subsidiaries was included on a consolidated basis (Claessens, Ghosh, and Scott 1999). See also Krueger 
and Yoo (2002, table 6).  
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policies astray. In the case of South Korea, most conventional static neoclassical analyses 
have concluded that these conditions were not met, at least in the most interventionist 
period—that is, the HCI drive of 1973–79.6  
But what about dynamic effects? Pack and Westphal (1986) argue that, in general, 
Korea’s selective intervention policy has been successful in fostering infant industries 
without significant losses in efficiency. The key has been to capture latent interindustry 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary externalities: “The Korean government can be seen as 
having achieved integrated decision-making by acting as a central agent mediating 
among market agents, forcing and facilitating information interchange and insuring the 
implementation of decisions reached…weighing costs and benefits from a collective 
standpoint and often intervening to reward cooperative players and punish uncooperative 
ones” (p. 99).7
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) formalize these notions in terms of 
Rodenstein-Rodan’s idea of the “big push.” Once again, there are multiple equilibria due 
to pecuniary externalities generated by imperfect competition with large fixed costs. They 
argue that industrial policy that “encourages industrialization in many sectors 
simultaneously can substantially boost income and welfare even when investment in any 
one sector appears impossible” (p. 1024). 
Each of these papers claim that the possibility exists for welfare-enhancing 
industrial policies through government coordination activities to capture interindustry 
                                                 
6 See Noland and Pack (2003) for a survey of the evidence. 
7 Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) provides a formal example of this in the form of a model of the interdependence 
of the two industries where industrial policy has a positive role in the form of preplay communication to 
generate a superior coordinated equilibrium. In both this model and that of Pack and Westphal, the same 
outcome could presumably be attained through organizational integration. Pack and Westphal argue that in 
the case of Korea this is not feasible: “The externalities may flow in complex and inseparable patterns 
among (actual and potential) agents covering most if not all of the industrial sector” (p. 99), necessitating 
government intervention. However, the existence of the giant chaebol, spanning the industrial sector, would 
appear to undermine this argument. If the chaebol cannot internalize these externalities, then it is hard to 
imagine what institution could. Indeed, it is unclear why the government would be any better able to 
coordinate decisions than the chaebol. It should also be noted that the Okuno-Fujiwara model is a closed 
economy model. For the intervention to convey some purely national welfare enhancement, there has to be 
some nontraded aspect of the externality. Otherwise, foreigners have access to the same low-cost inputs, 
and the pattern of production in the downstream industry is indeterminate without additional assumptions. 
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externalities, thus promoting growth and industrial development without the standard 
efficiency losses. The key is the existence of interindustry externalities, which when 
captured expand the production set of the economy. However, neither the attempts to 
assess this directly through the input-output table (Noland and Pack 2003) nor indirectly 
via time-series econometric analysis (Noland 2004) suggest that these conditions were 
met. 
If policies do not explain South Korea’s extraordinary growth performance, what 
does? South Korea’s geography is not auspicious—the existence of North Korea makes 
it, from an economic standpoint, an island; during this period, one neighbor, China, was 
effectively a closed economy, and another, Japan, was notoriously difficult to penetrate. 
Its major market, the United States, was far away. Nor is culture the explanation as the 
desultory example of North Korea demonstrates. Nor do South Korea’s institutions 
appear to be uniquely strong, as will be discussed in greater detail below. Instead, at least 
part of the explanation is that South Korea was “deceptively poor” and that its 
contemporaneous level of income in the 1950s or early 1960s was a downwardly biased 
indicator of its underlying capabilities. 
One might argue that South Korea is simply an example of neoclassical 
convergence. It started out poor, the rate of return on capital was high, and income rose 
rapidly as capital was accumulated. There is surely something to this argument—South 
Korea did start out poor, and the rate of return on capital was high (figure 5), but prior to 
the Park reforms in 1963, the rate of accumulation was actually low (figure 4), and much 
of it took the form of grant aid.  
A more sophisticated version of this argument would highlight the role of human 
capital. As seen in table 1, in the 1950s, South Korea was unusual in that the level of 
human capital embodied in the workforce was high relative to the contemporaneous level 
of income, presumably because most of the capital stock had been destroyed in the 
Korean War (1950–53). Interestingly, the Koreans had been able to maintain at least 
some production in all industrial sectors following the expulsion of Japanese colonists in 
1945, indicating that through whatever channels they had achieved a certain level of 
technical mastery. Table 1 suggests that this was a fairly capable population that simply 
did not have much physical capital to work with. 
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However, not only did South Korea have a high level of human capital relative to 
income, abetted by favorable demographics, it accumulated it more rapidly than other 
similarly situated comparators (figure 6). In the 1950s, the share of students receiving 
training in engineering and science, presumably of relative value in the production of 
industrial traded goods, was not much different than its contemporaries, but this share 
roughly doubled in the 1960s and remained above 30 percent for the next 30 years (table 
2). 
In addition, in Park, South Korea had a leader with a clear view of modernization 
through extensive contact with Japanese and American educational and military 
institutions. The country was also blessed with a thin layer of highly competent 
technocrats, many of whom had been educated in Japan or the United States, many on 
scholarships financed by US aid. (Indeed, the importance of sheer competence at the top 
cannot be overemphasized. South Korea was lucky to have a small but enormously 
important cadre of decision-makers who had some understanding of how a modern 
society was supposed to work—policymakers who through exposure to educational 
opportunities abroad had some notion of where they were heading and how to get there—
an advantage that many other contemporaneously developing countries simply did not 
have.) Although there were considerable disagreements over policy (often between the 
US-educated economists on one side and Park and his fellow officers on the other), one 
gets the impression that these were disagreements over strategies to attain shared 
development goals–not fundamental differences about modernization. 
Paradoxically, South Korea may have also benefited from its unusual 
endowments, specifically its lack of natural resources, in two ways (figures 7a and 7b). 
First, the absence of natural resources forced South Korea to specialize in manufacturing 
at a relatively low level of per capita income, and as capital was accumulated, despite the 
repression of labor, real wages increased monotonically reinforcing backward linkages 
and contributing to social peace.  
Moreover, the lack of resource-derived rents removed a source of contestation of 
state control. Land was an issue, but it was confiscated from Japanese colonists, and 
following a land reform in rival North Korea, the South Korean government undertook a 
similar reform with US support. The result, despite contemporary South Korea’s 
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obsession with inequality and redistribution, was “growth with equity”—at least relative 
to any real world comparator (table 3). 
  
TRANSITION…  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the South Korean state found itself under internal and 
external pressure to change. Internally, the democratization in the late 1980s had led to a 
surge in popular demands for reforms. At the same time, industrial firms in increasingly 
capital-intensive sectors found themselves disadvantaged in international competition by 
relatively high domestic interest rates and limited options for corporate finance. Sources 
of foreign pressure included the US government and with the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation, the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
South Korea’s growing prominence and the end of the Cold War contributed to an 
environment in which South Korea’s trade partners were more demanding that Seoul 
abide by international trade commitments, and the establishment of the WTO’s new 
dispute settlement mechanism provided them the accepted diplomatic instrument to do 
so. Additional external pressures for policy change grew out of South Korea’s 
negotiations to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), a political commitment undertaken by President Kim Young-sam (1992–97) to 
demonstrate South Korea’s status as a developed country, arguably the first to graduate 
from the ranks of the developing to the developed. 
The result of these internal and external drivers was a liberalization undertaken in 
the early 1990s that was less a product of textbook economic analysis than of parochial 
politicking. A combination of South Korean policy, its accession to the OECD, and the 
Basle accords on capital adequacy created unintended incentives for short-term bank 
borrowing. The highly leveraged nature of the South Korean economy, together with the 
currency and term mismatches embodied in the mid-1990s surge of foreign debt 
exposure, left the economy vulnerable to a variety of negative shocks, and in 1997, 
amidst a regional meltdown, South Korea experienced an economic crisis, evident in the 
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swing from roughly 7 percent growth in 1997 to a –7 percent contraction in 1998 before 
rebounding to more than 10 percent in 1999 (figure 1).8  
In a sense, South Korea benefited from the vagaries of the electoral calendar—
Kim Dae-jung, a former dissident, was elected president at the peak of the financial crisis 
in December 1997, entered the Blue House essentially owing nothing to the dominant 
interests in the society, and was free to blame the mishap on his predecessor. Indeed, one 
could argue that the relatively wide-ranging policy conditions attached to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout package helped Kim to advance his own 
relatively liberal economic agenda more effectively than if the Fund or some similar 
organization had not existed. It is perhaps telling that among South Koreans, the 1998 
recession came to be known colloquially as “the IMF recession,” identifying foreigners 
with responsibility for the distress. 
Given this freedom to maneuver, President Kim moved resolutely to extract 
concessions from both the labor unions and the chaebol. The crisis forced a restructuring 
of South Korea’s systems of finance, regulation, and corporate governance and a 
dismantling of the pervasive controls on international capital flows that characterized the 
precrisis regime. In the financial sector, the government immediately closed two 
brokerage houses and a number of merchant banks (including some affiliated with the 
chaebol). The government began auctioning off two nationalized commercial banks 
while putting other financial institutions on short tethers. Labor-market reforms that the 
National Assembly had rejected the previous year were passed with alacrity. The social 
safety net was expanded in an attempt to deal with the country’s first experience with 
mass involuntary unemployment. 
In the financial sector, prudential regulation was consolidated and strengthened 
through the creation of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the introduction 
of new regulatory practices, approaches, and standards. What appears to be more difficult 
to change has been the lending culture of South Korean financial institutions (Mann 
                                                 
8 In these regards, the South Korean case is similar to those of Japan and Taiwan, which also combined 
state-led growth and capital controls and in the 1990s experienced financial crises costing double-digit 
shares of GDP. There is a gigantic literature on the crisis. For entry points into this literature, see Wang and 
Zang (1998), Noland (2000), Smith (2000), Coe and Kim (2002), and the website maintained by the NBER, 
http://www.nber.org/~confer/2000/korea00/korea00.html. 
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2000). In the aftermath of the crisis, lenders went from bingeing on corporate lending to 
bingeing on household lending: South Korean household debt registered the fastest 
growth in the world, increasing 18 percentage points of GDP in two years, before ending 
in crisis with the insolvency of the country’s largest credit card issuer.9
Nevertheless, the improvement in the function of South Korea’s financial system 
can be seen in firm-level balance sheet data: South Korean corporations on the whole 
have reduced their leverage, and access to capital increasingly is a function of 
profitability (Alexander 2003). This development is, in turn, facilitated by improved 
corporate governance through enhanced financial transparency, stricter enforcement of 
existing laws, and expanded scope for minority shareholders to seek legal redress.  
South Korean equity markets have become more integrated with markets 
elsewhere. In part, this increase reflects the natural integration of markets following the 
removal of restrictions on foreign ownerships of South Korean stocks (foreigners now 
own approximately 45 percent of the shares on the Korean Stock Exchange) and the 
removal of restrictions on South Korean residents’ ability to invest abroad. Yet despite 
these developments, the interest rate spread on South Korean sovereign debt remains 
higher than it was precrisis, and despite recent increases in stock prices, South Korean 
firms continue to trade at a discount relative to foreign comparators (“the Korean 
discount”).  
One potential explanation is that the market still lacks independent institutional 
investors capable of monitoring management. To the extent that such institutional 
investors exist in South Korea, they tend to be affiliated with the major chaebol, and 
though some foreign institutional investors and the nascent shareholder rights movement 
have exerted some salutary influence, it is fair to say that the country still lacks a real 
market for corporate control. In the World Bank’s Doing Business in 2006 report, South 
Korea ranked 87th out of 155 countries in investor protection (World Bank 2005).  
It appears, at least to foreigners, that the South Korean government is ambivalent 
about their role in the economy.10 Foreign investment in South Korea has never been 
                                                 
9 See IMF (2004) for a summary of the credit card debacle. 
10 See, for example, commentaries by Graham (2005) and De Jonquieres (2005). 
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high. For decades, the government pursued policies that successfully impeded foreign 
investment. Even when foreign firms managed to invest in South Korea, they were 
typically relegated to minority stake joint ventures with South Korean partners. These 
policies were in part an understandable response to the country’s colonial history and 
fears that if the economy were opened widely to foreign investors, the country’s assets 
would be bought up wholesale by Japanese investors. 
But this is not the whole story. The state-led development strategy required that 
firms be responsive to government dictates. The bureaucrats rightly feared that foreigners 
would be less pliable than their domestic counterparts and thus required exclusionary 
laws and regulations to marginalize foreigners. Yet this approach that has outlived its 
usefulness appears to have inculcated in South Koreans unhelpful attitudes toward inward 
foreign investment. In the 2003 Pew Survey on Global Attitudes, one of the questions 
asked was whether respondents agreed with the statement that “our people are not 
perfect, but our culture is superior to others.”11 The share in South Korea responding 
affirmatively to this statement was a whopping 90 percent—the highest in any country 
polled. Yet while an astonishing share of South Koreans apparently feel culturally 
superior to the rest of the world, they also apparently lack confidence in their culture’s 
resilience—five out of six South Koreans think that it should be protected from foreign 
influence. 
The problem is that such attitudes are not associated with economic success. 
Instead, they are red flags to foreign investors, who wonder if such views are indicative 
of the type of reception that they are likely to receive from government officials, their 
employees, their suppliers, and their customers. The FSC has threatened penalties against 
foreign investors who seek to influence corporate management decisions without 
registering their intentions in advance. In one highly publicized case, the scandal-plagued 
management of the SK chaebol successfully portrayed itself as the defender of the 
national patrimony and repulsed the bid by Dubai-based Sovereign Asset Management to 
replace its upper management. While it is understandable that South Koreans are 
concerned about reports that foreign investors such as Newbridge Capital have exploited 
                                                 
11 More than 40,000 people in 46 countries were surveyed on a variety of issues in this poll. See Pew 
Center for the People and the Press (2003) for methodological details. 
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aspects of South Korean tax treaties to avoid taxation, the appropriate response is to close 
the loopholes. Newbridge took an enormous risk when it invested in South Korea—
something that South Korean investors were unwilling to do—and turned around a failed 
South Korean institution. The South Korean taxpayer, through the government’s 
ownership stake in Korea First Bank, has been a prime beneficiary.  
A similar story could be told of Daewoo Motors, once part of the fraud-ridden 
failed Daewoo conglomerate, which has been revitalized by General Motors. To the 
benefit of South Korean consumers, the resurrection of Daewoo Motors also has returned 
a modicum of competition to the South Korean car market, which had become a virtual 
monopoly of Hyundai. 
One can certainly question how important foreign investment is to economic 
development or whether its enhanced presence would exercise any decisive influence on 
performance. Yet given the structure of the South Korean economy, foreign investors, 
however self-interested, are a progressive force: they bring new technology, more 
professional styles of management; they act as a natural check on the still opaque family-
dominated chaebol; and are less amenable to manipulation by a state apparatus that still 
seeks to dominate. It is hard to imagine the government achieving its goal of turning 
South Korea into a regional business hub without them. 
 
….TO REFEREE? 
 
Despite its sterling performance over four decades, there is a growing sense that South 
Korea’s economic performance has begun lagging potential. The rate of growth appears 
to be in secular decline (whether this is justified by the fundamentals is a separate issue), 
and in cross-country surveys of underlying structural characteristics, South Korea’s 
rankings appear to be drifting downward, with some notable exceptions mainly involving 
technological capacity or prowess. There are many potential reasons and explanations for 
this perception of relative decline. I will focus on one—political institutions—fully 
cognizant that it is not the sole or possibly even the most important driver. 
Table 4 reports results for the 35 indicators comprising the “Public Institutions” 
section of the World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Index. This source 
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reports country scores based on surveying more than 7,000 business executives in more 
than 100 countries and could be interpreted as providing an indication of reputation, if 
not reality.12  
On the whole, South Korea does not fare particularly well. Most of the rankings 
cluster around the 50th percentile—not with respect to the membership of the OECD, 
arguably the relevant comparator group—but with respect to 104 countries including 
some very small, very poor, and former communist ones. Looking at the rankings in 
descending order of South Korea’s score, it would appear that South Korea does 
relatively well on some indicators that may signal basic bureaucratic capacity, such as 
extent of bureaucratic red tape, formalization of the economy, property rights, reliability 
of police services, and business costs of crime and violence. South Korea scores in the 
top third of the sample on all of these indicators. 
At the other extreme, South Korea scores poorly on indicators relating to politics: 
Trust in politicians, effectiveness of law-making bodies, and prevalence of illegal 
political donations are all in the bottom third of the sample. On these indicators, South 
Korea’s scores are similar to those of a number of formerly communist countries, such as 
Georgia, Bulgaria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Given the inclusiveness of the sample, South Korea’s scores on a number of 
indicators that might be considered fundamental institutions of a modern democratic 
polity are disturbingly weak: Efficiency of the legal framework is in the 54th percentile, 
tied with Jamaica, China, and Zambia; judicial independence is in the 46th percentile, tied 
with Morocco; irregular payments to the judiciary is in the 52nd percentile, tied with 
Colombia and India; and freedom of the press is in the 49th percentile, tied with Malta, 
Botswana, Bolivia, Latvia, and Slovenia.  
Lastly, from the standpoint of business, the costs of corruption appear to be 
relatively high, in the 56th percentile, tied with Morocco, El Salvador, Namibia, India, 
                                                 
12 The survey asks respondents to judge local conditions relative to a global best practices benchmark on a 
scale of 1 to 7. The World Economic Forum and its network of local affiliates attempt to get a cross-section 
of respondents from firms of differing sizes across a range of economic activities. The potential weakness 
of this approach is that the respondents may not know enough about the best practice standard to make a 
meaningful comparison with local circumstances. Methodological details of the survey, conducted during 
the first five months of 2004, are reported in Loades and Angels-Olivia (2004). 
18 
Gambia, Jamaica, and Mauritius. However, both the relative lack of bureaucratic red 
tape, and other survey evidence that indicates that senior managements of business firms 
do not report inordinate amounts of time spent by with government officials, suggest that 
there may be considerable corruption at the highest level of politics, but once policy 
decisions are made, they are implemented relatively efficiently by the bureaucracy 
(Noland and Pack 2003). There are reasons to believe that such systems impose less of a 
deadweight burden on the economy than systems characterized by cascading corruption 
all along the line (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
The countries that South Korea most frequently tied with in table 4—Thailand 
(6), Brazil (5), and India (5)—are all countries at lower levels of per capita income than 
South Korea.  This suggests that the development of political institutions has lagged 
South Korea’s economic development.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The South Korean case is fascinating because it combines in an unparalleled manner heterodox 
policies, success, and crisis.  The extent to which policies were a causal factor in South 
Korea’s development or whether the primary explanation of its success can be found in an 
unusual set of starting conditions and the country’s outstanding economic performance 
could have been replicated or exceeded under a different policy package is a subject of 
continuing academic debate. However, there is probably more consensus around the point 
that whatever the efficacy of the state-led model, it contains the seeds of its own destruction 
and transitioning from this model to a more market-oriented approach presents difficult 
political economy challenges. 
Today South Korea is an awkward interstice as the country tries to work out the 
appropriate role of the state. While there is a consensus that the country cannot return to the 
ways of the past, there appears to be less of a consensus about the way forward.  This 
difficulty is compounded by what appear to be—at least in the context of comparative 
data—institutional weaknesses in the political system.  South Korea’s economic 
development has, in effect, outstripped its political development.  A strengthening of those 
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political institutions and a clear redefinition of the role of the state vis-à-vis the economy 
would appear to be a central challenge looking forward.   
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Table 1 Human Capital Index and per capita income, mid-1950s
Country Year
Human 
Capital 
Index
Per capita 
income
Ratio of Human 
Capital Index to per 
capita income
Japan 1955 1,673 519 3.2
The Philippines 1956 738 277 2.7
South Korea 1955 494 217 2.3
Israel 1954 1,200 609 2.0
Thailand 1955 302 181 1.7
Greece 1956 693 468 1.5
Malaysia 1957 334 351 1.0
United States 1955 2,293 2,443 0.9
Italy 1956 787 971 0.8
Turkey 1955 267 365 0.7
Argentina 1955 760 1,059 0.7
Mexico 1955 352 637 0.6
Spain 1955 389 652 0.6
Source: Noland-Pack (2003)
Notes: Human Capital Index is educational expenditure embodied in the labor 
force. See Psacharopoulos (1973). Values for Japan, Mexico, Spain, Turkey, 
and the United States are interpolated from 1950 and 1960 observations; 
values for Greece and Italy are interpolated from 1951 and 1961 observations; 
values for Argentina and Thailand are interpolated from 1947 and 1960 
observations. Per capita income is the purchasing-power-adjusted figure in 
international dollars from the Penn World Table
 
 
Table 2 Share of Science and Engineering Tertiary Graduates
Year Share Year Share
Brazil 1957 10.5 1993 12.3
China 1960 40 1994 29.9
Egypt 1957 11.4 1995 10.2
India 1957 3.7 1991 16.3
Pakistan 1957 22.4 1992 11.2
South Korea 1957 15.9 1997 39.4
Taiwan 1957 30.6 n.a.
Turkey 1957 16.2 1994 23.6
Note: n.a. = not available.  1957 figure for Pakistan includes Bangladesh.
Source:  UNESCO Statistical Yearbook , 1970, 1998.
Circa. 1957 Circa. 1997
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Table 3 Gini coefficients
1970 1980 1990 2000
income land
Brazil 53 85 58 58 60 61
China n.a. n.a. n.a. 32 35 40
Egypt 42 67 40 38 32 2
India 33 52 32 32 30 3
South Korea 32 39 33 39 34 3
Taiwan 32 n.a. 29 28 31 32
Turkey 56 68 51 n.a. 44 40
Note: n.a. = not available.
1960
Sources: Land, Rodrik, 1994; income, 1960-1990, Deininger and Squire 1996; World Bank's World 
Development Indicators 2000.
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dicator
Percentile 
Ranking Countries Tied with South Korea
Extent of bureaucratic red tape 20 Jamaica, New Zealand, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Sweden, Australia, United 
Kingdom, Japan, United States, Tunisia, Denmark
Informal sector 25 Botswana, Czech Republic, Sweden, Canada, Jordan
Property rights 26 Israel, Jordan
Reliability of police services 29 Portugal, Chile
Centralization of economic policymaking 30 Serbia and Montenegro, Taiwan, Norway, El Salvador
Business costs of crime and violence 31 Thailand, Mali, Ghana, Turkey
Intellectual property protection 35 Hungary
Pervasiveness of money laundering through non-
bank channels
35 Gambia, Uruguay, Botswana, Ghana, El Salvador, South 
Africa, Slovenia, Morocco, China, Israel
Transparency of government policymaking 38 Thailand, Austria, France, Estonia
Pervasiveness of money laundering through 
banks
38 United Arab Emirates, India
Irregular payments in public utilities 40 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Brazil, Thailand
Organized Crime 43 Taiwan
Irregular payments in public contracts 45 China, Costa Rica, Hungary, Thailand
Judicial Independence 46 Morocco
Extent and effect of taxation 46 Uganda, Philippines, Latvia
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 47 Brazil, Malawi, Thailand, Costa Rica, Israel, Malta
Irregular payments in exports and imports 48 Brazil, Malaysia, Slovak Republic, Botswana
Freedom of the press 49 Malta, Botswana, Bolivia, Latvia, Slovenia
Diversion of public funds 50 El Salvador, Latvia, Egypt, Namibia
Irregular payments in judicial decisions 52 Colombia, India
Government effectiveness in reducing poverty 
and inequality
53 Indonesia, Bangladesh, Italy, Mali, Czech Republic, 
Kenya, Tanzania
Efficiency of legal framework 54 Jamaica, China, Zambia
Wastefulness of government spending 55 Mexico, Costa Rica, Ethiopia
Irregular payments in government policymaking 55 Hungary, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Mauritius, Zimbabwe
Business costs of corruption 56 Morocco, El Salvador, Namibia, India, Gambia, Jamaica, 
Mauritius
Business costs or irregular payments 58 India, Trinidad and Tobago, Italy, Algeria, Brazil, 
Argentina, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Mexico
Irregular payments in tax collection 61 Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Poland
Burden of central government regulation 63 Hungary, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia 
(FYR), Czech Republic, Kenya
Burden of local government regulation 64 Morocco, Macedonia (FYR), Panama, Uruguay, New 
Zealand, Portugal
Efficiency of the tax system 66 Egypt, Vietnam, Russian Federation
Irregular payments in loan applications 66 Argentina, India
Policy consequences of legal political donations 66 Macedonia (FYR), Mali, Greece, Mexico, Thailand, 
Pakistan
Prevalence of illegal political donations 74 Croatia, Costa Rica, Italy, Jamaica
Effectiveness of law-making bodies 78 Georgia, Macedonia (FYR)
Public trust of politicians 82 Bulgaria, Georgia, Chad, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Honduras
Source: Global Competitiveness Report, 2004-2005
Table 4 Public Institution Indicators
In
  
Figure 1 South Korean Real GDP growth, 1961-2003
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Figure 2 The Most Problematic Factors for Doing Business
Note: From a list of 14 factors, respondents were asked to select the five most problematic for doing business in 
their country and to rank them between 1(most problematic) and 5. The bars in the figure show the responses 
weighted according to their rankings.
Source: UNESCO'S Global Competitiveness Report, 2004-2005
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Foreign Aid to South Korea, 1953-1973
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 Figure 4 South Korean Savings and Investment, 1960-2003
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 Figure 5  Real Interest Rates
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Figure 6 Human capital accumulation, 1960 - 2000 
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